Tag: devsecops

  • Software Weaponization Raises DevSecOps Stakes

    Software Weaponization Raises DevSecOps Stakes

    The threat model that DevSecOps teams have been working from for the last decade was built around accidental vulnerabilities — mistakes that needed to be found and fixed before someone exploited them. That assumption is breaking. Vulnerabilities are increasingly being treated as strategic assets, stockpiled by nation-states and threat actors and held back from disclosure until they’re useful as weapons. That shift changes what “good enough” security looks like across the software delivery lifecycle.

    Mike Vizard sits down with Kate Scarcella and Tracy Ragan to dig into what software weaponization actually means in practice for engineering and security teams. Their argument is that the industry has spent years investing in pre-deployment scanning and not nearly enough in knowing what’s actually running in production. The result is sprawling estates of deployed software where teams can’t answer the basic question of which versions, in which configurations, are exposed to a newly disclosed, or quietly hoarded, vulnerability.

    They also get into the mechanics of closing that gap. Stronger SBOM practices are the foundation, but only if SBOMs are continuously updated, queryable and tied to the running environment, not parked in a build artifact. From there the conversation moves into automation: using AI-assisted tooling to identify exposed assets fast, prioritize remediation against real exploitability, and push fixes downstream without manual triage at every step.

    The other thread is organizational. AI is now both a tool defenders rely on and a source of new risk — data poisoning, model misuse, autonomous agents acting on stale context. Scarcella and Ragan make the case that this is the moment to break down the wall between developers, security teams and data scientists, with shared visibility, shared accountability and a runtime view of the entire software estate as the connective tissue.

  • The Messy Reality of Vibe Coding

    The Messy Reality of Vibe Coding

    The default reaction to vibe coding has been alarm — a default assumption that letting AI write large chunks of an application is going to flood production with vulnerabilities and undocumented behavior. That fear is doing as much damage as the bad code people are afraid of. Teams that freeze, ban the tools or push the work into the shadows end up with less visibility into how AI is actually showing up in their codebase, not more.

    Tyler Merritt, CTO at UneeQ, joins Mike Vizard to push back on the panic and reframe the problem. Merritt’s argument is that AI-assisted development is a construction site, not a finished building — and construction sites are inherently messy. The job for engineering leaders isn’t to keep the site spotless, it’s to make sure the right safety systems, inspections and review steps are wrapped around the work that’s happening anyway.

    They get into the practical mechanics of doing that. Instead of trusting any single model, Merritt makes the case for using multiple AI assistants — Claude, Gemini and others — as a kind of cross-check, where one model reviews what another produced and pulls weaknesses to the surface before they hit a pull request. Pair that with the existing toolchain (SAST, dependency scanning, code review, tests) and the AI output starts to look more like any other developer’s output: imperfect, but reviewable.

    The longer-term view is more optimistic than the headlines suggest. Merritt points out that no developer wakes up wanting to ship insecure code, and as these assistants get better at understanding context, security and intent, they have a real shot at making the secure path the easy path — turning today’s messy reality into a faster, safer way of building software.